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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID A. VARNER, 
Petitioner/Appellant. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Court of Appeals No.: 890610-CA 
COMES NOW, petitioner, by and through L. Long, lawyer of 
record, and hereby Petitions this court to review the Court of 
Appeals decision rendered on the 12th day of December, 1989, 
wherein the court summarily affirmed defendant's conviction. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The record clearly indicates that Officer Leary 
obtained defendant's consent to a blood test by use of coercion, 
deception, and chicanery by disguising his request as being 
merely for his investigation of the accident. 
2. The defendant's acquiescence to the officer's request 
was under a pretense that he would not go to jail, and the 
purpose of the blood test was for "investigation." The officer 
cloaked the criminal investigation for DUI with his need for 
information to complete his report about the accident. 
3. The officer discreetly implied that the blood test was 
a formality with his investigation of the events, and used the 
defendant's state of confusion to his advantage to obtain the 
necessary consent. 
ARGUMENT 
In order to support the State's contention that the 
defendant gave "actual consent" to the blood test, they relied 
solely on the testimony of Officer Leary. No other testimony was 
offered. This court concluded that the defendant did not present 
any evidence that would ha\/& contradicted the testimony of the 
officer; however, defendant maintains that the record establishes 
that the officer's testimony was clearly erroneous and 
inconsistent as established on cross-examination. The trial 
court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress the blood 
test. 
The defendant submits for review certain excerpts of the 
transcript from the hearing on the motion to suppress, held on 
the 6th day of July, 1989, attached hereto and by this reference 
made a part hereof, as follows: 
Page 6, line 20 through page 8, line 10. 
Direct examination by Kimberly Hornak 
Q. (By Ms. Hornak) Now, you talked to him and 
you noticed the injury. Did you make any other 
observations about his appearance? 
A. (Officer Leary) Yes, I did. While I was 
talking to him there was a, what appeared to be a strong 
odor of alcohol emitting from his person. While talking 
to him, I advised him that for investigative purposes 
I'd like to—have him consent to a blood test. This was 
while he was standing next to his vehicle. He indicated 
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to me, yes, tl iat would be fine, he's got no problem with 
that. That's about the time that I went back to my car 
to start the paperwork, 
Q. Now, at some point then did you accompany him 
to the hospital or — 
A. I didn't accompany him to the — with him to 
the hospital. He went to the hospital in the ambulance. 
After the scene was cleared up and I responded from the 
scene to the hospital, I again made contact with him in 
the suture room at St. Mark's Hospital. 
Q And what did you do when you made contact with 
him on that occasion? 
A. I asked him if Iie remembered who I was at the 
scene of the accident and asked him if he remembered 
that I asked him if he'd consent to a blood test. He 
indicated that he remembered who I was, that he would — 
that he told me that he wanted to consent to a blood 
test at the scene of the accident. He became hesitant 
at this point, indicating that he didn't want to go to 
jail. I advised him that with the investigation of the 
accident, he was not going to go to jail, that the 
hospital was going to attend to his injuries. 
I asked him that — if he still wanted to take 
the blood test; again he indicated that he, you know, 
didn't want to go to jail. I advised him that the blood 
test was for investigative purposes only and I said to 
him that "you don't have to take the test if you don't 
want to." 
He started talking, started rambling about the 
accident, that he was following some friends, et cetera. 
About that same time the doctor started to work on his 
injuries, clean up one of his wounds, he indicated to me 
at that point that he'd like to take the test. A blood 
test was then given. (Emphasis added) 
!he record is clear that the officer advised the defendant 
that the "blood test was for investigative purposes only." How-
ever, it is apparent that the officer inferred this to mean that 
the purposes were for investigation of the accident and not the 
possible criminal ramifications. The defendant was not advised 
that t:I ie i esu 11s wc i 11! J be \ i• $ed against I i i n i to pr ove that he was in 
fact under the influence of alcohol, but only that the blood 
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sample was part of the investigation. A phlegmatic individual 
without sufficient information to understand the consequences of 
consent to an officer's request is placed in an unfair advantage, 
and any evidence retrieved by the officer was obtained by deceit 
per se. 
The officer testified under cross-examination, as contained 
on page 25, beginning at line 12, that: 
THE WITNESS: ...When I first arrived at the 
hospital, he indicated — or I asked him if he 
remembered who I was and, again, I asked him if he 
would take the blood test. At that point we started to 
have a conversation concerning the going to jail part. 
And throughout that conversation I believe I asked him 
again or advised him again that he did not have to take 
the blood test although I would like him to consent to 
the blood test for my investigative purposes. I can't 
recall if I asked him three or four hundred times 
through that conversation or not. It was a conversation 
that he and I were having about going to jail. He 
started rambling on and on about the accident, what 
caused the accident, about his friends, et cetera. And 
then all of a sudden he blurted out, "Yes, I'll take the 
test, 
This court should take specific notice of the officer's 
testimony in the last sentence of each quoted sections above. The 
first indicates that the defendant merely agreed to take the test; 
however, the second mentions that he "all of a sudden blurted out" 
that he would take the test. This comment by the officer could be 
construed as merely a statement made under the pressure of fervent 
interrogation by defense counsel, and that the officer exaggerated 
his opinion of the events. Was this an involuntary eruption of 
excited response to the questioning; or, a more likely scenario 
of the events that transpired at the hospital to elicit consent 
from the defendant ? 
4 
The sole issue before this court is whether or not the 
consent LJ l^w^ ihe test was voluntary, or that the consent was 
finally ootai > - • ->'•• , -c-.-^ i-y . - ^ -r sati or i aboi jt investigative 
purposes, On closer inspection :*• this issue, the relevant point 
is intelligibly the term "voluntary." That term is defined as 
"unimpe11ed h
 f another's influence, spontaneous, acting of one-
self...The word, especially in statutes, often iniplies knowledge 
of essential facts." 81ack's Law Dictionary 1413 (5th Edition 
1979). 
This court is constantly faced wiU. u-e f i ue lirie between 
actual and voluntary consent as opposed to conservt given under 
exigent circumstances. The well trained officer in the field 
incorporates the "good buddy" attitude into his investigation for 
criminal activity. The defendant's memorandum in supporI of his 
motion to suppress cited In Interest of I., R.L., 739 P.2d 1123 
(Utah App. 1987) which stated as follows: 
An officer's demand that a non-arrested motorist submit 
to a chemical test may lead to arbitrary and unreasonable 
action by police officers, and to a potentially unconstitut-
ional search and seizure. However the constitutional right 
to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures may 
be waived if the defendant gives actual consent to the 
search in question. 
Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, 
but should be shown by clear and convincing evidence, 
and any consent must be voluntary and uncoerced, 
either physically or psychologically. 68 Am.Jur. 2d 
Searches and Seizures, § 46 (1973).(emphasis mine) 
The basic premise of actual consent is an element that the 
courts should not "lightly infer." The distiraction is drawn when 
an individual, as in Mr Varner's position, consents while under 
the tactful interrogation for the premise of constructing a 
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report. The officer's assurance that he would not go to jail is 
insufficient to justify the officer's approach to obtain consent. 
Furthermore the court determined that the defendant, in In 
Interest of I,. R.L., 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987), did not give 
his actual consent, and stated: 
There was nothing in his demeanor or behavior 
indicating actual consent. On the contrary, he 
offered some resistance to the taking of blood. 
Further, no one informed him that blood was being 
taken for purposes of determining blood alcohol 
content...Therefore, we conclude that the police 
failed to follow proper procedures and were not 
justified in requiring appellant to submit to the 
blood test. 
Also, under the circumstances, reasonable minds 
could conclude that blood was being withdrawn for 
medical rather than law-enforcement purposes. 
In the instant case, the officer finally obtained a verbal 
agreement to the taking of the blood; however, the defendant 
offered some resistance to the blood test, and he was not informed 
that the purpose was for determining alcoholic content to 
establish criminal charges. 
It would appear from the above passage that two critical 
ingredients were necessary in determining if consent was voluntary 
or impliedly compelled from the defendant. The first was that the 
defendant offered some resistance to the request for the blood 
test. In the case at bar, attention is focused on the testimony 
of the officer under cross-examination as contained on page 21, 
beginning at line 19, as follows: 
Q. And you stated here today under direct 
examination that you said you told him he didn't 
have to take the test if he didn't want to after he 
expressed a reluctance to take it; is that right? 
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A. He didn't — he did not express a reluctance 
to take the test. He indicated that he didn't want 
to go to jail. If you interpret that as a 
reluctance to take the test, then I guess that's 
your interpretation. But he didn't outright say he 
did not want to take the test. 
Q. Now, you wrote h&re — let me direct your 
attention to line — line 10, the end of line 10 
there that has writing on it at least where you say 
"he was hesitant in taking the blood test." Is 
that what you meant when you wrote it down? 
A. He was hesitant in taking the blood test, 
thinking I was going to take him to jail. 
Q. But you just testified that he was reluctant 
to go to jail. Everybody's reluctant to go to 
jail. But he was even reluctant to take the blood 
test, wasn't he? 
A. That's what it indicates here, yes. 
The above passage unquestionably identifies that the 
defendant "offered some resistance" to the officer's request to 
take the blood test. This court has determined the consent issue 
based on semantics alone, and has failed to draw the line at the 
point when an officer can continue with his veiled approach to 
obtain consent without constitutional violations. 
The second ingredient to this issue is that the defendant was 
not informed that the purpose of the test was to establish a blood 
alcohol content for possible criminal charges. The officer 
delicately avoided any discussion regarding the use of the test 
other than for "investigative purposes." The defendant was not in 
a position to make an informed decision that directly related to 
his constitutional right against self incrimination. The officer 
skirted the issue and down-played the necessity of the test which 
would eventually be used to prosecute the defendant. 
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It would appear, as applied to this case, that coercion is 
construed as thumb screws to elicit a confession. Coercion can 
be equally evoked through psychological means to obtain an end 
result. The officer used the defendant's state of mind and the 
situation to his advantage to elicit the necessary consent. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant maintains that the officer intentionally used 
the situation to elicit the consent to take the blood test. The 
defendant was in no condition to make an informed decision based 
on his right to know why blood would be taken. If this court 
allows officers in the field to extract blood from unweary and 
uninformed individuals based on the premise of mere investigation, 
then the constitution will be superseded by inventive methods to 
get around the individuals right to make a choice when one is 
apparent. 
THE PRICE FOR FREEDOM IS CONSTANT VIGILANCE. 
RESPECTFULLY SU8MITTED this 2Az^ day of December, 1989. 
^0>*e 
L. Long 
Lawyer for Defendant/Petitioner 
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Q. And did you investigate this accident? 
A. Yes, I did, 
Q. And what did you do as a part of your 
investigation? 
A. Well, I made contact with Mr, Varner at the 
scene of the accident. He was being attended to by emergency] 
personnel. He had a laceration about his head, some 
lacerations about his face. He was — when I first made 
contact with him, he was standing, being held up by part of 
his vehicle, he was basically sitting on the portion of 
his vehicle. Paramedics were looking at him. I asked 
him if he was a driver; he indicated he was. I asked for 
the pertinent information: driver's license, registration, 
et cetera; he produced a valid Utah driver's license. The 
•
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 J registration, I believe, and the insurance information 
was still in the car. He was in no condition to get that 
stuff out of the car so I proceeded to get it out of the 
car for him, at which time I let the paramedics work on 
him and then I went back to my car to start the paperwork. 
ft Now, you talked to him and you noticed the 
injury. Did you make any other observations about his 
appearance? 
A. Yes, I did. While I was talking to him there 
was a, what appeared to be a strong odor of alcohol emitting 











* for investigative purposes I'd like to — have him consent 
to a blood test. This was while he was standing next to 
his vehicle. He indicated to me, yes, that would be fine, 
* he's got no problems with that. That's about the time 
5 J that I went back to my car to start the paperwork. 
ft Now, at some point then did you accompany him 6 
^ j to the hospital or — 
* I A. I didn't accompany him to the — with him to 
' J the hospital. He went to the hospital in the ambulance, 
'0 I After the scene was cleared up and I responded from the 
11 I scene to the hospital, I again made contact with him in 
12 I the suture room at St. Mark's Hospital. 
13 ft And what did you do when you made contact with 
1* him on that occasion? 
15 ft. i asked him if he remembered who I was at the 
16 scene of the accident and asked him if he remembered that 
17 j I asked him if he'd consent to a blood test. He indicated 
that he remembered who I was, that he would — that he 
19 I told me that he wanted to consent to a blood test at the 
20 I scene of the accident. He became hesitant at this point, 
21 I indicating that he didn't want to go to jail. I advised 
*
2
 him that with the investigation of the accident, he was 
23 not going to go to jail, that the hospital was going to 
2 4
 j attend to his injuries. 




 the blood test; again he indicated that he, you know, didn't 
2
 want to go to jail. I advised him that the blood test 
3
 J was for investigative purposes only and I said to him that 
"you don't have to take the test if you don't want to." 
* He started talking, starting rambling about 
6
 I the accident, that he was following some friends, et cetera 
About that time the doctor started to work on his injuries, 
8
 J clean up one of his wounds, he indicated to me at that 
point that he'd like to take the test. A blood test was 
then given 
Q. Now, did you make a decision as to who was 
*2 I at fault in the accident? 
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the witness in person. At the scene of the accident I 
was handed a witness statement. I never did talk to a 
witness at the time of the accident. 
Q. And was somebody cited for being at fault in 
that accident? 
A. Yes. Well, they weren't exactly cited. The 
information was drawn up, yes. 
Q. All right. Who was that? 
A. That would be Mr. Varner. 
Q. All right. Now, when you say Mr. Varner, you 
refer to this gentleman sitting over here? 


























twice to take the test; once at the scene, once at the 
hospital. And then you said, "Well, I talked to him two 
or three times about the fact that he could refuse." So 
Mr. Long's wondering if you only asked him twice how you 
get talking about refusal two or three times, it doesn't 
seem to add up. 
THE WITNESS: I agree. 
THE COURT: And so he's curious how that — 
how you could testify that way. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. At the scene of the accident} 
I asked Mr. Varner if he would consent to a blood test. 
He indicated that he would. When I first arrived at the 
hospital, he indicated — or I asked him if he remembered 
who I was and, again, I asked if he would take the blood 
test. At that point we started to have a conversation 
concerning the going to jail part. And throughout that 
conversation I believe I asked him again or advised him 
again that he did not have to take the blood test although! 
I would like him to consent to the blood test for my 
investigative purposes. I can't recall if I asked him 
three or four hundred times through that conversation or 
not. It was a conversation that he and I were having about 
the going to jail. He started rambling on and on about 
the accident, what caused the accident, about his friends, 



























I'll take the test." 
I can't recall specifically how many times 
through that conversation I talked to him. 
Q. (By Mr. Long) How long did this conversation 
go on? 
A. Five minutes, maybe. 
Q. And you don' t know — you didn' t check to see 
if he'd been given — can I continue or — 
THE COURT: She'll tell you if there's a problem 
She's real good that way, so it must be okay. 
Q. (By Mr. Long) So during this five-minute 
conversation, you hadn't checked to see if he was under 
any medication? 
k No, I hadn't. 
Q. And so he was progressively rambling on and 
on as you were talking? 
A. Basically. 
MS. HORNAK: Objection. I don't think that's 
what he testified to. 


















he was progressively 
progressively, 


































but I have 
for refusing, wouldn't you? 
Yes, sir. 
But you didn't do that, did you? 
Nope. 
MS. HORNAK: Your Honor, I'm really sorry, 
anappointment. Could I take a brief recess 
to make a phone call? 
ft 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MS. HORNAK: I really apologize for this. 
[Brief recess.] 
THE COURT: Mr. Long. 
MR. LONG: Thank you, your Honor. 
Now, it's true, is it not, that he went by 







take the te 
reluctance 
A. 
to take the 
go to jail. 
Yes. 
— you went by your own means. 
By my patrol vehicle, yes. 
And you stated then here today under direct* 
that you said you told him he didn't have to 
st if he didn't want to after he expressed a 
to take it; is that right? 
He didn't — he did not express a reluctance 
test. He indicated that he didn't want to 


















the test, then I guess that's your interpretation. But 
he didn't outright say he did not want to take the test. 
ft Now, you wrote here — let me direct your 
attention to line — line 10, the end of line 10 there 
that has writing on it at least where you say "he was t 
hesitant in taking the blood test." Is that what you meant 
when you wrote it down? 
A. He was hesitant in taking the blood test, thinkirj 
I was going to take him to jail 
ft But you just testified that he was reluctant 
to go to jail. Everybody's reluctant to go to jail. But 
he was even reluctant to take the blood test, wasn't he? 
K That's what it indicates here, yes 
ft All this time that this is going on, the doctor 
is sewing up the wound in his head; isn't that right? 
k No, the doctor hadn't started sewing up the 
" I wound in his head yet 
18 
1
 ft But he was sitting there waiting for the doctor 
to come and give him a shot of something and start cleaning 
out the wound. 
21 I 
I A. The doctor could have already come and given 
him a shot, I don't know. It was in that time frame, yes. 
ft So, in other words, he could have been under 
the influence of drugs at the time you were asking him 
to — to make an informed decision as to whether he should 
22 
19 
20 
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